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Abstract
Dynamic reliability block diagrams (DRBDs) are introduced to overcome the
modeling limitations of traditional reliability block diagrams, such as the inability
to capture redundant components. However, so far there is no algebraic frame-
work that allows conducting the analysis of a given DRBD based on its structure
function and enables verifying its soundness using higher-order logic (HOL) the-
orem proving. In this work, we propose a new algebra to formally express the
structure function and the reliability of a DRBD with spare constructs based on
basic system blocks and newly introduced DRBD operators. We present several
simplification properties that allow reducing the structure of a given DRBD. We
provide the HOL formalization of the proposed algebra, and formally verify its
corresponding properties using the HOL4 theorem prover. This includes formally
verifying generic reliability expressions of the spare construct, series, parallel and
deeper structures in an extensible manner that allows verifying the reliability of
complex systems. Finally, we demonstrate the applicability of this algebra by
formally analyzing the terminal reliability analysis of a shuffle-exchange network
in HOL4.
Keywords— Dynamic Reliability Block Diagrams, Algebra, Theorem Proving, HOL4
1 Introduction
Reliability measures how reliable a system is by finding the probability that it will
continue to provide its desirable service in a given period of time. Fault trees (FTs) [1]
and reliability block diagrams (RBDs) [2] are the most commonly used reliability
modeling techniques. FTs graphically model the sources of failure of a system or
subsystem using FT gates. An RBD, on the other hand, is a graphical representation
of the reliability of a system. The components of a system are modeled as blocks and
are connected using connectors (lines) to create a path or multiple paths from the
RBD input to its output. These paths represent the required working blocks (system
components) for the system to have a successful operation. The modeled system
fails when components fail in such a manner that leads to the disconnection of all
the paths between the input and the output. RBDs can be connected in a series,
parallel, series-parallel or parallel-series fashion to create the appropriate modeling
structure depending on the behavior and the components redundancy of the modeled
system, which provides flexible and extensible modeling configurations to represent
complex systems. However, both of the traditional RBDs and FTs are unable to
model the dynamic behavior of system components, where the change of a state of
one component can affect the state of other system components.
Dynamic fault trees (DFTs) [1] are proposed as an extension to traditional FTs
by introducing DFT gates, such as spare gates. However, the only behavior that
is captured by DFTs is the dynamic failure effect of one system component in the
failure or activation of other components. To overcome the modeling limitations
of DFTs, RBDs are extended to dynamic reliability block diagrams (DRBDs) to
model the dynamic dependency among system components in several scenarios by
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introducing new constructs [3]. These new constructs are basically DRBD blocks that
enable modeling dynamic relationships among system components, such as a load
sharing construct that captures the effect of sharing a load on the reliability of system
components and spare construct that models the reliability of spare parts in a DRBD.
Formal methods have been used in the analysis of RBDs; both the dynamic
and static (traditional) ones. For instance, in [4], the formal semantics of DRBD
constructs in Object-Z formalism [5] are proposed. However, analyzing and verifying
the behavior of DRBDs based on this formalism is not feasible since there is a lack in
the support of the used tools. Therefore, in [5], the DRBDs are then converted into
a Colored Petri Net (CPN) to be analyzed using Petri nets tools. An algorithm to
automatically convert a DRBD into a CPN is also proposed in [6]. Since CPN is used,
only some state-based properties of the modeled system can be analyzed. In [7], the
HOL4 theorem prover [8] is used to formalize several configurations of static RBDs.
However, this formalization can only analyze the combinatorial behavior of systems
and cannot provide support to analyze DRBDs. In addition, this formalization cannot
be tailored to provide support for DRBDs, and thus, it is required to have a brand
new higher-order logic (HOL) formalization to support this kind of analysis.
In system engineering, it is important to be able to analyze DRBDs qualitatively
in order to identify the sources of system vulnerability, and quantitatively in order to
evaluate the system reliability. However, to the best of our knowledge, so far there
exists no algebraic approach that mathematically models a given DRBD and enables
expressing its function based on basic components just like the DFT algebra [9]. Using
such algebra in the reliability analysis will result in simpler and fewer proof steps than
the DFT-based algebraic analysis [9], since the probabilistic principle of inclusion and
exclusion will not be invoked. In this work, we propose a new algebraic approach for
DRBD analysis that allows having a DRBD expression to be used for both qualitative
and quantitative analyses. We introduce new operators to mathematically model the
dynamic behavior in DRBD structures and constructs. In particular, we use these
operators to model a DRBD spare construct besides traditional series, parallel, series-
parallel and parallel-series structures. Moreover, we provide simplification theorems
that allow reducing the structure of a given DRBD. This DRBD structure can be then
analyzed to obtain a generic expression of the system reliability. The reliability ex-
pressions obtained using this approach are generic and independent of the distribution
and density functions that represent the system components. Although basic operators,
such as OR and AND, were introduced in [3], they are only useful to model parallel and
series constructs of dependent components. Moreover, there is no general mathemati-
cal expression that would allow reasoning about the behavior of DRBDs. In addition,
the DRBDs constructs of [3] are quite complex, which complicates modeling large sys-
tems. Therefore, we use the constructs proposed in [4] as they are much simpler, which
facilitates defining the new algebra to model various new DRBD constructs. In this
work, we use the DRBD constructs of [4]. Leveraging upon the expressive nature of
HOL, we formally verify the soundness of the proposed DRBD algebra using HOL the-
orem proving. Although the formalization development can be conducted using many
theorem provers, we choose the HOL4 theorem prover, as our existing formalization of
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DFT algebra can be useful since our proposed DRBD algebra is compatible with the
DFT’s. The work contributions can be summarized as:
• A new DRBD algebra that includes DRBD operators and simplification theorems
that allow expressing the structure of a given DRBD.
• A HOL formalization of the introduced DRBD algebra, i.e., modeling the DRBD
operators and verifying their simplification theorems using HOL4 to ensure the
soundness of the proposed approach.
• A mathematical expression and HOL formalization of the spare construct and its
reliability.
• Mathematical models and reliability expressions of the traditional series, parallel
and deeper structures for an arbitrary number of inputs using the new DRBD
operators with their HOL formalization.
• Formal reliability analysis of two real-world systems
Our ultimate goal is to develop a formally verified algebra that follows the tradi-
tional reliability expressions of the series and parallel structures in an easily extensible
manner and at the same time can capture the dynamic behavior of real-world systems.
Our formalization differs from and overcomes the formalization of traditional RBDs
presented in [7] in the sense that it can formally express the structure function of a
DRBD using the introduced DRBD operators. In addition, it can formally model and
analyze DRBD spare constructs. Furthermore, we model the traditional RBD struc-
tures, i.e., series, parallel and deeper structures in a way similar to the mathematical
models available in the literature, which makes it easily understood and followed by
reliability engineers that are not familiar with HOL theorem proving. Finally, we illus-
trate the usefulness of the proposed developments in conducting the formal analysis of
two real-world systems; the terminal reliability of a shuffle-exchange network and the
reliability of a drive-by-wire system.
2 DRBD Algebra
In this section, we present the proposed algebra for DRBD analysis. This algebra
allows modeling the structure function of DRBDs with spare constructs. Moreover,
we present some simplification properties that enable reducing the structure function
when possible. Throughout this work, we assume that system components or blocks
are represented by random variables that in turn represent their time-to-failures. In
addition, we assume that system components are non-repairable, i.e., we are interested
in expressing the reliability of the system considering that the failed components will
not be repaired. It is worth mentioning that our proposed algebra follows the general
lines for the DFT algebra [9], which allows DFTs conversion into DRBDs for conducting
their analysis as well.
The reliability of a single component, which time-to-failure function is represented
by random variable X, is mathematically defined as [2]:
RX(t) = Pr{s | X(s) > t} = 1− Pr{s | X(s) ≤ t} = 1− FX(t) (1)
where FX(t) is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of X.
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We call {s | X(s) > t} as a DRBD event as it represents the set that we are
interested in finding the probability of until time t:
event (X, t) = {s | X(s) > t} (2)
2.1 Identity Elements, Operators and Simplification Proper-
ties
Similar to the identity elements of ordinary Boolean algebra and DFT algebra [9],
we introduce two identity elements, i.e., ALWAYS and NEVER, that represent two
states of any system block. The ALWAYS element represents a system component
that always fails, i.e., it fails from time 0. While the NEVER element represents a
component that never fails, i.e., the time of its failure is +∞. These identity elements
play an important role in the reduction process of the structure functions of DRBDs,
as will be introduced in the following sections.
ALWAY S = 0 (3)
NEV ER = +∞ (4)
We introduce operators to model the relationship between the various blocks in a
DRBD. These operators can be divided into two categories: 1) The AND and OR
operators that are not concerned with the dependencies among system components.
2) Temporal operators, i.e., After, Simultaneous and Inclusive After, that can capture
the dependencies between system components. It is worth mentioning that DRBDs
are concerned with modeling the several paths of success of a given system. Therefore,
if we are concerned in knowing the success behavior of a DRBD until time t, it means
that we are interested in knowing how the system would not fail until time t. As a
result, we can use the time-to-failure random variables in modeling the time-to-failure
of a given DRBD, i.e., its structure function. It is assumed that for any two system
components that possess continuous failure distribution functions, the possibility that
these components fail at the same time can be neglected.
In [3], AND and OR operators were introduced to model the parallel and series
constructs between dependent components only without providing any mathematical
model to these operators. We propose to use the AND (·) and OR (+) operators to
model series and parallel blocks in a DRBD, respectively without any restriction. We
provide a mathematical model for each operator based on the time of failure of its in-
puts, as listed in Table 1, to be used in the proposed algebra. The AND operator models
the series connection between two or more system blocks, as shown in Figure 1(a). For
example, the DRBD in Figure 1(a) will continue to work only if component X and
component Y are working. Once one of these blocks stops working, then there will be
no connection between the input and the output of the DRBD and thus the system
will no longer work. We model the AND operator as the minimum time of its input
arguments. Similarly, the OR operator models the connection between parallel com-
ponents in a DRBD. For example, the DRBD in Figure 1(b) will continue to work if
X is working or Y is working. All the components in a parallel structure should fail
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(a) Series DRBD (b) Parallel DRBD
Figure 1: Two-Block Series and Parallel DRBDs
for this DRBD to fail. Therefore, we model the OR operator as the maximum time
of failure of its input arguments, which represents the time of failure of basic system
blocks or sub-DRBDs. This approach facilitates using these operators to model even
the complex structures.
If X and Y are independent, then the reliability of the systems, shown in Figure
1, can be expressed as in Table 1. To reach these expressions, it is required first to
express the DRBD events as the intersection and union for the AND and OR operators,
respectively, as:
event ((X · Y ), t) = event (X, t) ∩ event (Y, t) (5)
event ((X + Y ), t) = event (X, t) ∪ event (Y, t) (6)
In order to model the dynamic behavior of systems in DRBDs, we introduce new
temporal operators: after (B), simultaneous (∆), and inclusive after(D), as listed in
Table 2. The after operator represents a situation where it is required to model a
component that continues to work after the failure of another. The time of failure of
the after operator equals the time of failure of the last component, which is required
to fail. However, if the required sequence does not occur, then the output can never
fail, i.e., the time of failure equals +∞. The behavior of the simultaneous operator
is similar to the one introduced in the DFT algebra [9]. The output of this operator
fails if both its inputs fail at the same time, otherwise it can never fail. Finally, the
inclusive after operator encompasses the behavior of both the after and simultaneous
operators, i.e, it models a situation where it is required that one component continues
to work after another one or fail at the same time, otherwise it can never fail. In the
case of dealing with basic components, the inclusive after will behave in a similar way
as the after operator. Therefore, their probabilities can be expressed for independent
Table 1: Mathematical and Reliability Expressions of AND and OR Operators
Operator Math. Expression Reliability
AND X · Y = min (X, Y ) R(X·Y )(t) = RX(t) × RY (t)
OR X + Y = max (X, Y ) R(X+Y )(t) = 1− ((1−RX(t))× (1−RY (t)))
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Table 2: Mathematical Expressions of Temporal Operators
After(B) Simultaneous(∆) Inclusive After(D)
X B Y =
{
X, X > Y
+∞, X ≤ Y X∆Y =
{
X, X = Y
+∞, X 6= Y X D Y =
{
X, X ≥ Y
+∞, X < Y
random variables in the same way as:
R(XBY )(t) = 1−
∫ t
0
fX(x)× FY (x) dx (7)
where FX is the probability density function (PDF) of X and FY is the CDF of Y .
We introduce several simplification properties to reduce the structure function of a
DRBD. These simplification properties range from simple ones, such as the associativity
and idempotence of the operators, to more complex theorems. The idea of these
properties is to reduce the algebraic expressions based on the time of failure. For
example, X ·ALWAY S = ALWAY S means that if a component in a series structure is
not working, i.e., always fails, then the series structure is not working as well. Similarly,
X + NEV ER = NEV ER means that if a component in a parallel structure cannot
fail, then the whole parallel structure cannot fail as well. X + Y = Y + X, X · Y =
Y · X and X∆Y = Y∆X represent the commutativity property for the OR, AND
and simultaneous operators, respectively. An example of a more complex theorem is
X B (Y · Z) = (X B Y ) · (X B Z). In Section 3, a full list of the developed theorems
will be introduced.
2.2 DRBD Constructs and Structures
The spare construct, shown in Figure 2 [4], is introduced in DRBDs to model situa-
tions where a spare part is activated and replaces the main part, after its failure, by
introducing a spare controller to activate the spare [4]. Depending on the failure be-
havior of the spare part, we can have three variants, i.e., hot, warm and cold (H|W |C)
spares. The hot spare possesses the same failure behavior in both its active and dor-
mant states. The cold spare cannot fail in its dormant state and is only activated after
the failure of the main part. The failure behavior of the warm spare in the dormant
state is attenuated by a dormancy factor from the active state. In order to distinguish
between the dormant and active states of the spare, just like the DFT algebra [9], we
use two different symbols to model the spare part of the DRBD spare construct, one
for the dormant state and the other for the active one. For the spare construct of
Figure 2, the spare X is represented by Xa and Xd for the active and dormant states,
respectively. After the failure (F ) of the main part Y , X will be activated (A) by the
spare controller. We model the structure function of the spare construct (Qspare) using
the DRBD operators based on the description of its behavior as:
Qspare = (Xa B Y ) · (Y BXd) (8)
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Thus, we need two conditions to be satisfied in order for the spare to work. The first
one is that the active state of the spare will continue to work after the failure of the
main part (XaB Y ). The second condition is that the main part will continue to work
after the failure of the spare in its dormant state (Y BXd). However, since the spare
part can only fail in one of its states (Xa, Xd) but not both as it is non-repairable, only
one of the terms in Equation (8) affects the behavior and the other term can never fail,
i.e., it fails at +∞.
Since the spare construct of the DRBD and the spare gate of the DFT exhibit
complementary behavior, i.e., the DRBDs consider the success and the DFTs consider
the failure, we can use the probability of failure of the spare DFT gate [9] to find the
reliability of the spare DRBD construct. It is assumed that the dormant spare and
the main part are independent since the failure of one does not affect the failure of the
other. However, the failure of the active spare is affected by the time of failure of the
main part, since it will be activated after the failure of the main part. We express the
reliability of the spare as:
Rspare(t) = 1−
∫ t
0
∫ t
y
f(Xa|Y=y)(x) fY (y)dxdy −
∫ t
0
fY (y)FXd(y)dy (9)
where f(Xa|Y=y) is the conditional density function of Xa given that Y failed at time
y. Equations (8) and (9) represent the general behavior of the spare, i.e., the warm
spare. The hot and cold spares represent special cases of the warm spare and can be
expressed as:
Qhotspare = X + Y (10)
Qcoldspare = Xa B Y (11)
In Equation (10), the spare part X has the same behavior in both states and thus
there is no need to use any subscript to distinguish both states. The probability
of Equation (10) can be expressed using the reliability of the OR operator, given in
Table 1. While the reliability of the cold spare construct can be expressed as:
Rcold spare(t) = 1−
∫ t
0
∫ t
y
f(Xa|Y=y)(x) fY (y) dx dy (12)
Table 3 lists the mathematical and reliability expressions of these structures [2]. The
series structure represents a collection of blocks that are connected in series, as shown
in Figure 3(a). The system continues to work until the failure of one of these blocks.
We define a series structure that represents the intersection of all events of the blocks
in this structure as in Table 3, where Xi represents the i
th block in the series structure
and n is the number of blocks. Interestingly, any block in our proposed algebra can
Figure 2: Spare Construct
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(a) Series (b) Parallel (c) Series-Parallel (d) Parallel-Series
Figure 3: DRBD Structures
represent a basic system component or a complex structure, such as a spare construct.
Moreover, since we are dealing with the events, we can use the ordinary reliability
expressions for the series structure assuming the independence of the individual blocks.
The parallel structure, shown in Figure 3(b), represents a system that continues to work
until the failure of the last block in the structure. The behavior of the parallel structure
can be expressed using the OR operator. We represent the parallel structure as the
union of the individual events of the blocks. The series-parallel structure, shown in
Figure 3(c), represents a series structure, where the blocks of the series structure are
parallel structures. The structure function of this structure can be expressed using
AND of ORs operators. Table 3 lists the model for this structure with its reliability
expression, where n is the number of blocks in the parallel structure and m is the
number of parallel structures that are connected in series. The parallel-series structure
represents a group of series structures that are connected in parallel, as shown in
Figure 3(d). Its structure function can be expressed using OR of ANDs operators.
3 Formalization of DRBDs in HOL
In this section, we present our formalization for the proposed DRBD algebra includ-
ing DRBD events, operators and constructs, simplification theorems and reliability
expressions. First, we review some HOL probability theory preliminaries required for
understanding the rest of the work.
Table 3: Mathematical and Reliability Expressions of DRBD Structures
Structure Math. Expression Reliability
Series
⋂n
i=1(event (Xi, t))
∏n
i=1RXi(t)
Parallel
⋃n
i=1(event (Xi, t)) 1−
∏n
1=1(1−RXi(t))
Series-Parallel
⋂m
i=1
⋃n
j=1(event (X(i,j), t))
∏m
i=1(1−
∏n
j=1(1−RX(i,j)(t)))
Parallel-Series
⋃n
i=1
⋂m
j=1(event (X(i,j), t)) 1− (
∏n
i=1(1−
∏m
j=1(RX(i,j)(t))))
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3.1 HOL Probability Theory
The probability space is defined in HOL as a measure space, where the measure (prob-
ability) of the entire space is 1. A probability space is a measure space and is defined
as a triplet (Ω,A,Pr), where Ω is the space, A are the probability events and Pr is
the probability [10]. Two functions are defined in HOL; p space p and events p, that
return the space (Ω) of the above triplet and the events (A), respectively. A random
variable is a measurable function that maps the probability space p to another space.
It is defined in HOL as [10]:
Definition 3.1. ` ∀X p s. random variable X p s ⇔
prob space p ∧ X ∈ measurable (p space p, events p) s
where X is the random variable, p is the probability space and s is the space that the
random variable maps to. In our work, we use the borel space, which is defined over
the real line [11].
For a random variable X, the probability distribution is defined as the probability
that this random variable belongs to a certain set [12]:
Definition 3.2.
` ∀p X. distribution p X = (λs. prob p (PREIMAGE X s ∩ p space p))
The cumulative distribution function (CDF) is defined as [13]:
Definition 3.3. ` ∀p X t. CDF p X t = distribution p X {y | y ≤ (t:real)}
Table 4: HOL4 Probability Functions
Function Explanation
rv gt0 ninfinity L Random variables in list L are greater than 0 and not equal
to +∞
indep var p lborel
(real o X) lborel (real o Y)
Independence of random variables defined from the proba-
bility space p to the Lebesgue Borel measure (lborel)
distributed p lborel (real o X) fx Defines a density function fx for the real version of ran-
dom variable X defined from the probability space p to the
Lebesgue-Borel measure
measurable CDF p (real o Y) Ensures that CDF (FY) is measurable
cont CDF p (real o Y) Ensures that CDF (FY) is continuous
cond density lborel lborel p
(real o X)(real o Y) y fxy fy fXa|Y
Defines a conditional density function fXa|Y using the joint
density function fxy and the marginal density function fy
den gt0 ninfinity fXaY fY fXa|Y Ensures the proper values for the density functions; joint,
marginal and conditional, respectively. 0 ≤ fXaY, 0 < fY
and 0 ≤ fXa|Y
indep sets p X s Ensures that the group of sets X indexed by the numbers
in set s are independent over the probability space p
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where p is a probability space, X is a real-valued random variable and t is a variable
of type real and represents time.
Independence of random variables is an important property that ensures that the
probability of the intersection of the events of these random variables equals the product
of the individual events. This definition is ported from Isabelle/HOL [14] to HOL4
as [11]:
Definition 3.4. ` indep vars p M X ii =
(∀i. i ∈ ii ⇒
random variable (X i) p (m space (M i), measurable sets (M i))) ∧
indep sets p
(λi. {PREIMAGE f A ∩ p space p|(f=X i) ∧ A ∈ measurable sets (M i)}) ii
This definition ensures that a group X is composed of random variables indexed by
the elements in set ii and that the events represented by the preimage of these random
variables are independent using indep sets. indep var is defined, based on Definition
3.4, to capture the behavior of independence for two random variables [11].
Finally, the Lebesgue integral is defined in HOL4 based on positive simple functions
and then extended for positive functions and functions with positive and negative
values [10]. Throughout this work, we use the Lebesgue integral for positive functions,
i.e., pos fn integral, since we are integrating cumulative distribution and probability
density functions, which are always positive. The integration is over the real line
and thus we use the Lebesgue-Borel measure (lborel) [11] for this purpose. The
boundaries of this integral can be identified using an indicator function by specifying
the set of elements used in the integration. For example,
∫
A
fdx can be represented
as pos fn integral lborel (λx. indicator fn A * f x). However, for the ease
of understanding, we use the regular mathematical expressions, i.e., we use
∫
f dx to
express integrals instead. Table 4 lists the probability theory functions used in the rest
of the work [13].
3.2 DRBD Event
In our formalization, we define the inputs, or the random variables representing the
time to failure of system components, as lambda abstracted functions with a return
datatype of extended-real, which represents real numbers besides ±∞.
We define the DRBD event of Equation (2) as:
Definition 3.5.
` ∀p X t. DRBD event p X t = {s | Normal t < X s} ∩ p space p
where Normal typecasts the real value of t from real to extended-real. This type con-
version is required since we need real-valued random variables. However, we need to
deal with the extended-real datatype to model the NEVER element. Therefore, we de-
fine the time-to-failure functions to return extended-real and typecast the values from
extended-real to real using the function real and vice versa using Normal.
We define the reliability as the probability of the DRBD event according to Equa-
tion (1):
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Definition 3.6. ` ∀p X t. Rel p X t = prob p (DRBD event p X t)
We verify the relationship between the reliability and the CDF of Equation (1) as:
Theorem 3.1. ` ∀p X t. rv gt0 ninfinity [X] ∧
random variable (real o X) p borel ⇒
(Rel p X t = 1- CDF p (real o X) t)
where real typecasts the values of the random variable from extended-real to real as
the CDF is defined for real-valued random variables, random variable (real o X) p
borel ensures that (real o X) is a random variable over the real line represented by
the borel space, and rv gt0 ninfinity ensures that the random variable is greater
than or equal to 0 and not equal to +∞, as described in Table 4, which means that the
time of failure of any component cannot be negative or +∞. Theorem 3.1 is verified
based on the fact that the DRBD event and the set of the CDF are the complement of
each other. Therefore, the probability of one of them equals one minus the other. For
the rest of the work, we will denote CDF p (real o X) t by FX(t) to facilitate the
understanding of the theorems.
3.3 Identity Elements, Operators and Simplification Theo-
rems
Our formalization of the identity elements and the DRBD operators is listed in Table 5,
where extreal is the extended-real datatype in HOL4, PosInf represents +∞, min
and max are HOL functions that return the minimum and maximum values of their
arguments, respectively. This formalization follows the proposed definitions in Tables
1 and 2. However, we define the operators as lambda abstracted functions to be able
to conduct the probabilistic analysis later. In addition, we verify several simplification
theorems based on the properties of extreal numbers in HOL and the definitions of
the DRBD operators. For example, the following theorem represents the distributive
property of the after operator over the AND:
Theorem 3.2. ` ∀X Y Z. X B (Y · Z) = (X B Y)·(X B Z)
Table 6 lists the simplification theorems that we developed and verified in the
proposed algebra.
In order to verify the reliability of the DRBD constructs, such as the spare, we
need first to verify the reliability of the DRBD operators that are used to express the
structure function of these constructs. For the AND and OR operators, we verify their
reliability expressions as in Theorems 3.3 and 3.4, respectively.
Theorem 3.3. ` ∀p X t. rv gt0 ninfinity [X;Y] ∧
indep var p lborel (real o X) lborel (real o Y) ⇒
(Rel p (X·Y) t = Rel p X t * Rel p Y t)
Theorem 3.4. ` ∀p X t. rv gt0 ninfinity [X;Y] ∧
indep var p lborel (real o X) lborel (real o Y) ⇒
(Rel p (X + Y) t = 1 - (1 - Rel p X t) * (1 - Rel p Y t))
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Table 5: Definitions of Identity Elements and DRBD Operators
Element/Operator Mathematical Expression Formalization
Always element ALWAY S = 0 ` R ALWAYS = (λs. (0:extreal))
Never element NEV ER = +∞ ` R NEVER = (λs. PosInf)
AND X · Y = min(X,Y ) ` ∀X Y. R AND X Y =(λs. min (X s) (Y s))
OR X + Y = max(X,Y ) ` ∀X Y. R OR X Y = (λs. max (X s) (Y s))
After X B Y =
{
X, X > Y
+∞, X ≤ Y
` ∀X Y. R AFTER X Y =
(λs. if Y s < X s then X s else PosInf)
Simultaneous X∆Y =
{
X, X = Y
+∞, X 6= Y
` ∀X Y. R SIMULT X Y =
(λs. if X s = Y s then X s else PosInf)
Inclusive After X D Y =
{
X, X ≥ Y
+∞, X < Y
` ∀ X Y. R INCLUSIVE AFTER X Y =
(λs. if Y s ≤ X s then X s else PosInf)
We verify Theorem 3.3 by first rewriting using Definition 3.6. Then, we prove that
DRBD event of the AND operator equals the intersection of the individual events, as
in Equation (5). Utilizing the independence of the real-valued random variables real
o X and real o Y, the probability of intersection of their events equals the product of
the probability of the individual events. Since X and Y are greater than 0 and are not
equal to +∞, based on the function rv gt0 ninfinity, the events in the probability
space that correspond to X and Y are equal to the ones that correspond to real o X
and real o Y. As a result, the DRBD events of X and Y are independent. Hence, the
probability of their intersection equals the product of the probability of the individual
Table 6: Formally Verified Simplification Theorems
Simplification Theorem
` ∀X. (∀s. 0 ≤ X s) ⇒ (X · R ALWAYS = R ALWAYS)
` ∀X Y Z. (X · Y) · Z = X · (Y · Z)
` ∀X Y. X · Y = Y · X
` ∀X. X · X = X
` ∀X. X · R NEVER = X
` ∀X. (∀s. 0 ≤ X s) ⇒ (X + R ALWAYS = X)
` ∀X Y Z. (X + Y) + Z = X + (Y + Z)
` ∀X Y. X + Y = Y + X
` ∀X. X + X = X
` ∀X. X + R NEVER = R NEVER
` ∀X Y. X + (X · Y) =X
` ∀X Y Z. X rhd (Y B Z) = ((X B Y) + (X B Z)) (Y B Z)
` ∀X Y. (X B Y) + (Y B X) = R NEVER
` ∀X Y Z. X B (Y · Z) = (X B Y) · (X B Z)
` ∀X Y Z. X · (Y + Z) = (X · Y) + (X · Z)
` ∀X Y Z. X + (Y · Z) = (X + Y) · (X + Z)
` ∀X Y. X D Y = (X B Y) · (X ∆ Y)
` ∀X Y Z. X B (Y + Z) = (X B Y) + (X B Z)
` ∀X Y. X ∆ Y = Y ∆ X
13
events, i.e., their reliability. Theorem 3.4 is verified in a similar way. However, we prove
that the DRBD event of the OR operator equals the union of the individual events, as
in Equation (6). We verify that this union of events equals to the complement of the
intersection of the complements of the individual events. Now, Theorem 3.4 can be
proven using the independence of random variables.
We extend the definition of the AND and OR operators to n-ary operators, nR AND
and nR OR, that can be used to represent the relationship between an arbitrary number
of elements. We formally define n-ary AND (nR AND) as:
Definition 3.7.
` ∀X s. nR AND X s = ITSET (λe acc. R AND (X e) acc) s R NEVER
where ITSET is the HOL function to iterate over sets. This definition applies the R AND
over the elements of X indexed by the numbers in s. R NEVER is the identity element
of the R AND operator.
Similarly, we formally define n-ary OR (nR OR) as:
Definition 3.8.
` ∀X s. nR OR X s = ITSET (λe acc. R OR (X e) acc) s R ALWAYS
where R ALWAYS is the identity element of the R OR operator. The reliability of these
two operators would be similar to the reliability of the series and parallel structures,
respectively, as will be described in the following section.
Finally, we verify the reliability expression of the after operator utilizing our for-
malization in [13], where the description of the assumptions is listed in Table 4:
Theorem 3.5. ` ∀X Y p fx t. rv gt0 ninfinity [X; Y] ∧ 0 ≤ t ∧
indep var p lborel (real o X) lborel (real o Y) ∧
distributed p lborel (real o X) fx ∧ (∀x. 0 ≤ fx x) ∧
cont CDF p (real o Y) ∧ measurable CDF p (real o Y) ⇒
(Rel p (XBY) t = 1-
∫ t
0fX(x) × FY(x) dx)
The proof of this theorem is based on Pr(Y < X < t) =
∫ t
0
fX(x)×FY (x) dx, which
has been verified in [13] using the properties of the Lebesgue integral and independence
of random variables. The DRBD after operator represents a situation where the system
continues to work until two components fail in sequence. Thus, the above expressions
allow us to verify the reliability expression of the after operator, as the DRBD and
DFT events complement one another.
3.4 DRBD Constructs and their Reliability Expressions
As mentioned previously, the spare construct can have three variants according to the
type of the spare block. We formally define the generic case, i.e., the warm spare
(WSP) as:
Definition 3.9. ` ∀Y Xa Xd. R WSP Y Xa Xd = (Xa B Y) · (Y B Xd)
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Since the DRBD and DFT events complement one another, we use our formalization
of the probability of failure of the warm spare gate [13] to verify the reliability of the
WSP construct:
Theorem 3.6. ` ∀p Y Xa Xd t fY fXaY fXa|Y. 0 ≤ t ∧
(∀s. ALL DISTINCT [Xa s; Xd s; Y s]) ∧ DISJOINT WSP Y Xa Xd t ∧
rv gt0 ninfinity [Xa; Xd; Y] ∧ den gt0 ninfinity fXaY fY fXa|Y ∧
(∀y. cond density lborel lborel p (real o Xa)(real o Y) y fXaY fY fXa|Y) ∧
indep var p lborel (real o Xd) lborel (real o Y) ∧
cont CDF p (real o Xd) ∧ measurable CDF p (real o Xd) ⇒(
Rel p (R WSP Y Xa Xd) t) =
1 - (
∫ t
0 fY(y) ∗ (
∫ t
y f(Xa|Y=y)(x) dx) dy +
∫ t
0 fY(y)FXd(y)dy)
)
where ALL DISTINCT ensures that the main and spare parts cannot fail at the same
time, DISJOINT WSP Y Xa Xd t ensures that until time t, the spare can only fail in
one of its states and den gt0 ninfinity ascertains the proper values of the density
functions; joint (fXY ), marginal (fY ) and conditional (fXa|Y ). The description of these
assumptions is listed in Table 4 [13]. More details about the formal definitions of these
functions can be found in [13]. Theorem 3.6 is verified by first defining a conditional
density function fXa|Y for random variables (real o Xa) and (real o Y). This is re-
quired as the failure of the spare part is affected by the time of failure of the main part.
Therefore, it is required to define this conditional density function then prove the ex-
pression based on the probability of failure of the DFT spare gate, which is verified
based on the properties of the Lebesgue integral. We formally define the cold spare
construct (CSP), which is a special case of the WSP, as:
Definition 3.10. ` ∀Y X. R CSP Y X = (λs. if Y s < X s then X s else PosInf)
This definition means that the CSP construct will continue to work until the main
part fails then the spare part is activated and fails in its active state. It is worth noting
that since the spare part has only one state that affects the behavior of the CSP, which
is the active state, therefore, we do not use any subscript with the active state, as the
dormant state has no effect here in the behavior. We verify the reliability of the CSP
construct based on the probability of failure of the CSP gate as [13]:
Theorem 3.7. ` ∀p X Y fXY fY fX|Y t. 0 ≤ t ∧
rv gt0 ninfinity [X; Y] ∧ den gt0 ninfinity fXY fY fX|Y ∧
(∀y. cond density lborel lborel p (real o X)(real o Y) y fXY fY fX|Y) ∧(
Rel p (R CSP Y X) t) = 1 - (
∫ t
0 fY(y) ∗ (
∫ t
y f(X|Y=y)(x) dx) dy
)
The conditions required for this theorem are similar to the ones of Theorem 3.6, as
the WSP exhibits the behavior of the CSP if the main part fails before the spare.
Finally, we define the hot spare construct (HSP) as:
Definition 3.11. ` ∀Y X. R HSP Y X = (λs. max (Y s) (X s))
This means that the HSP acts like the OR operator, where at least one of the
main or the spare parts should continue to work for the HSP construct to maintain
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its successful behavior. Therefore, we can use Theorem 3.3 to express the reliability of
the HSP construct.
We formally define the series structure as:
Definition 3.12. ` ∀Y s. DRBD series Y s =
⋂
i∈s
(Y i)
We define the series structure as a function that accepts a group of sets, Y, that are
indexed by the numbers in set s and returns the intersection of these sets.
The parallel structure is defined in a similar way but it returns the union of the
sets rather than the intersection. We formally define it as:
Definition 3.13. ` ∀Y s. DRBD parallel Y s =
⋃
i∈s
(Y i)
The group of sets, Y, in both structures represents a family of events, i.e, Y will
be instantiated later with DRBD events. The reliability expressions of the series and
parallel structures are given in Table 3. We verify these expressions as:
Theorem 3.8.
` ∀p X t s. s 6= {} ∧ FINITE s ∧
indep sets p (λi. {rv to event p X t i}) s ⇒
(prob p (DRBD series (rv to event p X t) s) =
Normal (
∏
i∈s
(real (Rel p (X i) t))))
Theorem 3.9.
` ∀p X t s. s 6= {} ∧ FINITE s ∧
indep sets p (λi. {rv to event p X t i}) s ∧
(∀i. i ∈ s ⇒ rv to event p X t i ∈ events p) ⇒
(prob p (DRBD parallel (rv to event p X t) s) =
1 - Normal (
∏
i∈s
(real (1 - Rel p (X i) t))))
where s6={} ∧ FINITE s ensures that the set of indices, s, is nonempty and finite.
The reliability of the series structure is verified based on the independence of the input
events using indep sets, which ensures that for the probability space p, the given
group of sets ((λi. {rv ti event p X t i}) indexed by the numbers in set s are
independent, as described in Table 4. The family of sets ((λi. {rv ti event p X t
i}) represents the DRBD events of the group of time-to-failure functions, X. This is
defined as:
Definition 3.14. ` ∀p X t. rv to event p X t = (λi. DRBD event p (X i) t)
The function rv to event enables us to create the group of DRBD event of time-to-
failure functions of system blocks (X). Based on the independence of these sets and the
definition of the series structure (intersection of sets), we verify that the probability of
the series structure is equal to the product of the reliability of the individual blocks (Rel
p (X i) t), where i∈s. The product function (∏) in HOL4 returns a real value and the
probability returns extreal, therefore, it is required to typecast the product function to
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extreal using Normal. Similarly, the product function finds the product of real-valued
functions, therefore, it is required to typecast the reliability function(Rel) to real using
the real function. The parallel structure is verified in a similar way. We replace the
parallel structure (the union of events) with the complement of the intersection of the
complements of the events. Then, we verify that the probability of this complement
equals one minus the probability of the intersection of the complements. This requires
the added condition that all DRBD events created using rv to event belong to the
events of the probability space p.
In order to express the series and parallel structures using DRBD operators, we
verify that these structures are equal to the DRBD events of the nR AND and nR OR,
respectively:
Theorem 3.10. ` ∀p X t s. FINITE s ∧ s 6= {} ⇒
(DRBD event p (nR AND X s) t = DRBD series (rv to event p X t) s)
Theorem 3.11. ` ∀p X t s. FINITE s ∧ 0 ≤ t ⇒
(DRBD event p (nR OR X s) t = DRBD parallel (rv to event p X t) s)
We verify Theorems 3.10 and 3.11 by inducting on set s using SET INDUCT TAC that will
create two subgoals to be solved; one for the empty set and another one for inserting
an element to a finite set. Furthermore, we use the fact that the DRBD event of the
AND and OR operators equal the intersection and the union of the individual events,
respectively. For Theorem 3.11, an additional condition is required, 0≤t, to be able to
manipulate the sets and reach the final form of the theorem.
Interestingly, these structures can be easily extended to model and verify more
complex structures, such as two-level structures, i.e., series-parallel and parallel series
structures. We formally verify the reliability of the series-parallel structure as:
Theorem 3.12. ` ∀p X t s J.
indep sets p
(λi. {rv to event p X t i}) (
⋃
j∈J
(s j)) ∧
(∀i. i ∈ J ⇒ s i 6= {} ∧ FINITE (s i)) ∧
FINITE J ∧ J 6= {} ∧ disjoint family on s J ⇒
(prob p
(DRBD series
(λj. DRBD parallel
(rv to event p X t) (s j)) J) =
Normal
(
∏
j∈J
(1 -
∏
i∈(s j)
(real (1 - Rel p (X i) t)))))
We formally verify the reliability of the parallel-series structure as:
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Theorem 3.13.
` ∀p X t s J.
indep sets p
(λi. {rv to event p X t i}) (
⋃
j∈J
(s j)) ∧
(∀i. i ∈
⋃
j∈J
(s j) ⇒ rv to event p X t i ∈ events p) ∧
(∀i. i ∈ J ⇒ s i 6= {} ∧ FINITE (s i)) ∧
FINITE J ∧ J 6= {} ∧ disjoint family on s J ⇒
(prob p
(DRBD parallel
(λj. DRBD series
(rv to event p X t) (s j)) J) =
1 -
Normal
(
∏
j∈J
(1 -
∏
i∈(s j)
(real (Rel p (X i) t)))))
The main idea in building these two-level structures is to partition the family of
blocks into distinct groups, where we use a set, J, to index these partitions, i.e., it
includes the number of groups in the first top level. Then, for each group in this top
level, we have another set, {s j| j ∈ J}, that includes the indices of the blocks in the
second level, i.e. the subgroups. For example, consider the parallel-series structure of
Figure 3(d), if n = m = 1, then the outer parallel structure has two series structures,
where each series structure has two blocks. Thus, J = {0;1}. For each j∈J, we have
a certain set s j that has the indices of the blocks in the inner series structure. Thus,
s = (λj. if j = 0 then {0;1} else {2;3}). The same concept is applied to the
series-parallel structure. Therefore, the structure of the DRBD can be determined
based on the given sets of indices.
We verify Theorems 3.12 and 3.13 by extending the proofs of the series and parallel
structures. However, it is required to deal with the intersection of unions in case of
the series-parallel structure and the union of intersections in case of parallel-series
structure. Therefore, we need to extend the independence of sets properties to include
the independence of union and intersection of partitions of the events. We verify these
properties as:
Theorem 3.14. ` ∀p s J Y. indep sets p (λi. {Y i}) ⋃j∈J (s j) ∧ J 6= {} ∧
(∀i. i ∈ J ⇒ countable (s i)) ∧ FINITE J ∧ disjoint family on s J ⇒
indep sets p (λj. {⋃i∈s j (Y i)}) J
Theorem 3.15. ` ∀p s J Y. indep sets p (λi. {Y i}) ⋃j∈J (s j) ∧ J 6= {} ∧
(∀i. i ∈ J ⇒ countable (s i) ∧ s i 6= {}) ∧ FINITE J ∧
disjoint family on s J ∧ (∀i. i ∈ ⋃i∈J (s j) ⇒ Y i ⊂ m space p) ⇒
indep sets p (λj. {⋂i∈s j (Y i)}) J
where set J includes the indices of the partitions and s has the indices of the individual
blocks of each partition, disjoint family on ensures that the indices of the blocks in
different partitions are disjoint and indep sets p (λi. {Y i}) ⋃j∈J (s j) ensures
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the independence of the family of blocks {Y i} where the indices of the individual
blocks are given by the union of s. In order to verify Theorems 3.14 and 3.15, we need
the fact that the σ-algebras generated by (λj.
⋃
i∈s j{Y i}) with index set J are
independent. Then we verify that ∀j. j ∈ J, set {⋃i∈s j {Y i}} is a subset of
the σ-algebra generated by
⋃
i∈s j{Y i} . Finally, based on these intermediate verified
steps and the definition of indep sets, we are able to verify these theorems.
In order to verify the reliability of the series-parallel structure, we need to ensure
the independence of the individual blocks. Therefore it is required to combine the
indices of all blocks into a single set using ⋃j∈J (s j) to be used with indep sets. To
be able to use the reliability of the series structure in this proof, we use Theorem 3.14
to verify the independence of the unions of partitions of events. This means verifying
that the parallel structures are independent, i.e., the probability of intersection of
these parallel structures equals the product of the reliability of the parallel structures.
Finally, several assumptions related to sets {s i| i ∈ J} and J are required, which
include that these sets are finite and nonempty. Finally, it is required that every block
has a unique index, which is ensured using disjoint family on. The reliability of
the parallel-series structure is verified in a similar manner based on the reliability of
the parallel structure. We verify the independence of the intersection of partitions of
events rather than the union using Theorem 3.15. In addition, it is required that all
DRBD events belong to the events of the probability space.
We extend the reliability of the two-level series-parallel structure to verify the reli-
ability of a more nested structure, i.e., series-parallel-series-parallel, as:
Theorem 3.16. ` ∀p X t s L A J.
(∀i. i ∈ nested BIGUNION s L A J ⇒ rv to event p X t i ∈ events p) ∧
indep sets p (λi. {rv to event p X t i}) (nested BIGUNION s L A J) ∧
sets finite not empty s L A J ⇒
(prob p
(DRBD series (λj.
DRBD parallel (λa.
DRBD series (λl.
DRBD parallel (rv to event p X t) (s l)) (L a)) (A j)) J) =
Normal
(
∏
j∈J
(1 -
∏
a∈(A j)(1 -
∏
l∈(L a) (1 -
∏
i∈(s l)(real (1 - Rel p (X i) t)))))))
For this four-level nested structure, we have four sets (indexed sets) that determine
the structure of the DRBD, which are: J, A, L and s. This is similar to the two-level
nested structure but with a deeper hierarchy. Therefore, in order to combine the indices
of all the individual blocks in the DRBD in a single set, we define nested BIGUNION
s L A J to union the elements of all s i, where i∈ L a, a∈ A j and j∈J. This is
done in a hierarchical manner and can be extended easily to deeper levels. We use
the previously mentioned function to ensure that all the individual events belong to
the probability events and are independent as well. Moreover, it is required to ensure
that the sets are finite, disjoint and nonempty, just like the series-parallel structure.
We combine these set-related conditions using the function sets finite not empty.
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Figure 4: DRBD of drive-by-wire system
Finally, we verify Theorem 3.16 within two main steps. The first step is to verify the
reliability of the outer series-parallel, which requires verifying the independence of the
intersection of union of partition of the DRBD blocks, i.e., the inner series-parallel
structures are independent. The second step is to verify the reliability of the inner
series-parallel structures, which can be done based on some set manipulation. This
theorem can be used to verify even deeper structures, which would require verifying the
independence of more nested structures. We use Theorem 3.16 to verify the reliability
of the series-parallel-series structure as it represents a special case of the series-parallel-
series-parallel, where each of the innermost parallel structures has only one block. Our
formalization follows the natural definitions of parallel and series structures. Moreover,
our verified lemmas of independence allow verifying deeper structures, which makes our
formalization flexible and applicable to model the most complex systems. The proof
script, which is available at [15], of our formalization required around 3200 lines. In
the following section, we utilize our formalization in the verification of the reliability
of two real-world systems.
4 Applications
To demonstrate the applicability of our proposed DRBD algebra, we present the formal
reliability analysis of a drive-by-wire system (DBW) [16] and a shuffle-exchange network
(SEN) [17] to verify generic expressions that are independent of the failure distribution
of the system components, i.e., we can use different types of distributions to model the
failure of system components as long as they satisfy the required conditions, such as
the continuity.
The DRBD of the DBW system, shown in Figure 4, models the successful behavior
of a key part of the modern automotive industry. This system controls the functionality
of the vehicle using a computerized controller. We provide the analysis of the throttle
and brake subsystems. The throttle subsystem continues to work as long as the throttle
(TF) and the engine (EF) are working. In addition, the system successful operation
requires the operation of the brake control unit (BCU). The system includes a primary
control unit (PC) with a warm spare (SC) that replaces the main part after failure.
Finally, the system needs the operation of the throttle sensor (TS) and the brake sensor
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Figure 5: Reliability of DBW system
(BS). The DRBD of this system is modeled as a series structure with a spare construct.
We express the structure function of this DRBD using our operators:
QDBW = TF · EF · BCU · (R WSP PC SCa SCd) · TS · BS
Then we verify the DBW reliability as:
Theorem 1. ` ∀p TF EF BCU PC SCa SCd TS BS t.
DBW set req p TF EF BCU PC SCa SCd TS BS t ⇒
(prob p (DRBD event p QDBW t) =
Rel p TF t * Rel p EF t * Rel p BCU t * Rel p (R WSP PC SCa SCd) t *
Rel p TS t * Rel p BS t)
where DBW set req ensures the proper conditions for the independence of the blocks
in the DBW system. In Figure 5, we evaluate, using MATLAB, the reliability of
the DBW system assuming exponential distributions for the system components with
failure rates as given in the figure and a dormancy factor of 0.5.
In multi-processor systems, it is required to have an efficient communication method
among system components, such as processors and memories. Multistage interconnec-
tion networks (MINs) can provide the necessary switching in multi-processor systems.
A MIN consists of sources (inputs) and destinations (outputs) and is divided into a
single-path MIN or a multiple-path MIN. In single-path MINs, there is only one possible
path between each source and destination. Therefore, loosing any of the intermediate
connections may lead to a failure. A SEN is an example of a single-path MIN. In order
Figure 6: DRBD of Shuffle-exchange Network with Spare Constructs
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to increase the reliability of such network, additional switching elements are added to
the network which provide additional paths between each source and destination. A
SEN having two paths between each source and destination is usually called SEN+.
The terminal reliability analysis, which is the reliability of the connection between a
given source and destination, is usually conducted using traditional RBDs [17]. Al-
though the reliability of the system is increased going from SEN to SEN+, each source
is always connected to a single switch and the same thing applies to the destination.
The failure of these single switches would lead to the failure of the connection. There-
fore, we propose to further enhance the reliability of this connection by using spare
parts for these single switches so they can be replaced after failure. The DRBD of the
modified SEN+ is shown in Figure 6, where Y and Z are the main single switches that
are connected to the source and destination with their spares Y s and Zs, respectively.
The parallel structure in the middle represents the reliability model of the two alter-
native paths between the source and the destination. Therefore, this DRBD consists
of a series of two spare constructs and one parallel structure that consists of two series
structures.
Using our DRBD operators, we formally express the structure function of this
DRBD as:
QSEN = nR AND (λi. if i = 0 then R WSP Y Ysa Ysd
else if i = 1 then
(
(nR AND X L1) + (nR AND X L2)
)
else R WSP Z Zsa Zsd) {0; 1; 2}
(13)
Thus, the outer series structure is expressed using the nR AND operator over the set
{0; 1; 2} as this structure has three different structures; i.e., two spare constructs and
one parallel structure. In order to re-utilize the verified expressions of reliability, it
is required to express this DRBD using the series and parallel structures. Therefore,
we verify that the DRBD event of the QSEN is equal to a nested series-parallel-series
structure as:
Theorem 4.1. ` ∀p X Y Ysa Ysd Z Zsa Zsd t L1 L2.
DISJOINT3 {0; 3} L1 L2 ∧ FINITE L1 ∧ FINITE L2 ∧ L1 6= {} ∧ L2 6= {} ⇒
(DRBD event p QSEN t =
DRBD series (λj.
DRBD parallel (λa.
DRBD series (λi.
event set
[(DRBD event p (R WSP Y Ysa Ysd) t,0);
(DRBD event p (R WSP Z Zsa Zsd) t,3)]
(rv to event p X t) i)
ind set [{0}; L1; L2; {3}] a))
(ind set [{0}; {1; 2}; {3}] j)) {0; 1; 2})
where DISJOINT3 ensures that all sets are disjoint. Since DRBD series accepts a group
of indexed sets, we define a function event set that accepts a list of pairs each of which
is composed of a DRBD event with its index. This function also accepts the remaining
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blocks of the DRBD that have their indices embedded in a set (that can be generic of
any size), such as the parallel structure of the SEN. We also define ind set that accepts
a list of sets and returns a group of indexed sets. Since we are dealing with a series-
parallel-series structure, we need three sets to identify the hierarchy of this nested
structure. Set {0; 1; 2} in Theorem 4.1 indicates that the outer series structure has
three elements, i.e., three parallel structures. ind set [{0}; {1;2}; {3}] indicates
that the first parallel structure has only one series structure with index 0, the second
parallel structure has two series structures with indices 1 and 2, and the third parallel
structure has only one series structure with index 3. Finally, ind set [{0}; L1; L2;
{3}] implies that the first series structure has only one element with index 0, the
second and third series structures have an arbitrary number of blocks indexed by L1
and L2. The last series structure has one element with index 3. We verify Theorem
4.1 using Theorem 3.10 and the equivalence of the event of the OR with the union of
events besides some set-related theorems.
Based on Theorem 4.1, we verify a generic expression for the reliability of the SEN
system:
Theorem 4.2. ` ∀p X Y Ysa Ysd Z Zsa Zsd t L1 L2.
SEN set req p L1 L2 (ind set [{0}; L1; L2; {3}])
(ind set [{0}; {1; 2}; {3}]) {0; 1; 2}
(event set [(DRBD event p (R WSP Y Ysa Ysd) t,0);
(DRBD event p (R WSP Z Zsa Zsd) t,3)] (rv to event p X t)) ⇒
(prob p (DRBD event p QSEN t) =
Rel p (R WSP Y Ysa Ysd) t * Rel p (R WSP Z Zsa Zsd) t *
(1 - (1 - Normal (
∏
l∈L1 (real (Rel p (X l) t)))) *
(1 - Normal (
∏
l∈L2 (real (Rel p (X l) t))))))
where SEN set req ensures the required conditions of the input sets including that the
sets are finite and nonempty. It also ensures the independence of the input events over
the probability space and that they belong to the probability events. We first rewrite
the goal using Theorem 4.1, then we use the reliability of the series-parallel-series
to verify the final expression. The reliability of the spare constructs can be further
rewritten using Theorem 3.6 given that the required conditions are ensured, such as
the continuity of the CDFs. The final theorem with the expressions of the reliability of
the spare constructs is available in [15]. Finally, we evaluate the reliability of the SEN
system assuming the same failure rate of 1× 10−5 for all switching elements. We also
assume that each series structure has 16 switching elements. We evaluate the reliability
for the SEN system without and with spare parts with a dormancy factor of 0.1, as
shown in Figure 7. This result shows that considering the spares in the reliability
analysis leads to having more reliable and realistic system than the traditional RBDs.
To sum up, we are able to provide a generic expression of reliability of the SEN+
system that is verified in HOL theorem proving, which cannot be obtained using any
other formal method. In addition, through the verified reliability expressions of the
SEN+ and DBW systems, we demonstrated that our formalization is flexible and
can be used to model more complex systems of an arbitrary number of blocks by
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Figure 7: Reliability of SEN with/without spare constructs
implementing its hierarchy using sets that can be instantiated later to model a specific
system structure, which is an added feature of our formalized algebra.
5 Conclusion
In this work, we proposed a new algebra to analyze dynamic reliability block diagrams
(DRBDs). We developed the HOL formalization of this algebra in HOL4, which ensures
its correctness and allows conducting the analysis within a theorem prover. Further-
more, this algebra provides formalized generic expressions of reliability that cannot be
verified using other formal tools. This HOL formalization is the first of its kind that
takes into account the system dynamics by providing the HOL formal model of spare
constructs and temporal operators. The proposed algebra is compatible with the relia-
bility expressions of traditional RBDs as demonstrated by the reliability expressions of
the series and parallel structures. It also facilitates extending the verified reliability ex-
pressions to model complex systems using nested structures. Finally, we demonstrated
the usefulness of this work by formally conducting the analysis of a drive-by-wire and
a shuffle-exchange network systems to verify generic expressions of reliability, which
are independent of the failure probability distribution of system components. We plan
to extend this algebra to include other DRBD constructs, such as state dependencies,
with their formalization in HOL, which would provide a more complete framework to
algebraically analyze DRBDs within HOL theorem proving.
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